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Abstract
We provide existence results for equilibria of games where players em-
ploy abstract (non-binary) choice rules. Such results are shown to en-
compass as a relevant instance that of games where players have (non-
transitive) SSB (Skew-Symmetric Bilinear) preferences, as well as other
well-known transitive (e.g. Nash’s) and non-transitive (e.g. Shafer and
Sonnenschein’s) models in the literature. Further, our general model con-
tains games where players display procedural rationality.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C60, C72,
D83
Keywords: non-cooperative games, non-binary choice, SSB preferences,
procedural rationality.
1 Introduction
Game Theory postulates fully rational agents who are able to employ their
reasoning capabilities to coordinate in an equilibrium. The (empirically based
and experimentally nourished) dissatisfaction of economists with such extreme
assumptions has given rise to a large literature where agents are assumed to
display “bounded rationality” instead (see e.g. Simon [29]). A large part of
this literature is behavioral in nature, i.e. it conceives of agents as focusing on
actions, not being necessarily able to predict the ultimate outcome. Technically,
we can think of agents as being endowed with a behavioral rule, which is merely
a mapping from the current situation (e.g. the proﬁle of actions taken by other
players) to (a probability distribution over) actions. One such rule is, naturally,
best reply, which in a sense puts classical game theory back into the picture,
since Nash equilibria are the ﬁxed points of this particular rule. Other rules
that come to mind are imitation, better reply, and procedural rationality (in
the sense of Osborne and Rubinstein [23]).1
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1Bounded rationality, though, is not only a concern of Game Theory but
of all Decision Theory. Within this realm, a diﬀerent branch of the literature
has built upon the recognition that bounded rationality might still be cap-
tured by decision-theoretic models, prompting a re-examination of the most
basic assumptions of the agents’ way of perceiving alternatives (preferences).
For instance, the theory of Skew-Symmetric-Bilinear (SSB) preferences (see e.g.
Fishburn [11]) provides a framework for preferences which might fail one of the
most basic rationality tests, that of transitivity (see also Shafer [27]).
An alternative approach to account for non-rational factors would be to
move away from preferences, focusing instead on choices. Hence, agents are
endowed with an abstract way to make choices which might not be supported by
any underlying binary relation whatsoever (see e.g. Nehring [20]). Technically,
agents are now endowed with choice rules,2 which specify the acceptable choices
given the range of available actions.
If we now consider agents interacting in a strategic situation, it is obvious
that there exists a strong analogy between behavioral rules and choice rules.
Formally, both are mappings from situations to actions. Conceptually, both are
attempts to encompass bounded rationality within a general formal model of
agents’ behavior.
In the present work we aim at illustrating the analogies and connections
between both approaches. To this end, we consider general games where players
employ abstract (non-binary) choice rules (or, alternatively, behavioral rules).
The existence of equilibria in games has been extensively justiﬁed on the
basis of ﬁxed point theorems, beyond Nash’s original contribution [17, 18]. De-
breu [8] showed that the linearity assumption can be weakened to quasicon-
cavity. Kreweras [15] and Fishburn and Rosenthal [12]) consider non-transitive
preferences of the SSB form; another work accounting for lack of transitivity is
Shafer and Sonnenschein [28] (see also Border [4, Corollary 19.4]). Dekel, Safra,
and Segal [9] consider certain non-expected utility preferences (where violations
of the reduction of compound lotteries assumption are allowed). Crawford [6]
analyzes preferences not satisfying the independence axiom (and exhibits an ex-
ample of non-existence when quasiconcavity fails). From a diﬀerent perspective,
Osborne and Rubinstein [23] consider equilibria where players do not necessarily
act on the basis of preference maximization, but rather follow certain, speciﬁc
reasoning processes (procedural rationality).
Adding to this literature, we investigate conditions for the existence of equi-
libria (Choice-Nash equilibria) of games where (some of) the agents are able
to express their tastes on prospective outcomes only through (not-necessarily
binary) choice rules.
As a ﬁrst, almost trivial but necessary step, we translate some elementary
ﬁxed point results into straigtforward existence proofs for Choice-Nash equilib-
ria. This gives rise to a number of diﬀerent existence results of considerable
generality. Later on the paper, we illustrate their reach deducing from them
well-established existence theorems such as Shafer and Sonnenschein’s [28] the-
orem on equilibria in normal-form games.
Relying on the recent literature on non-binary choice (Nehring [19], Alcan-
tud [1]), we move on to provide a new existence result for Choice-Nash equilib-
2The term choice function is also used, but they are actually correspondences. In choosing
the term choice rule, we follow Mas-Colell et al [16].
2ria. Then we show that such a new existence result encompasses games where
players have SSB preferences (which, in general, need neither be transitive nor
satisfy the independence axiom), as well as Nash’s theorem and the classical
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility case.
Last, we go on to illustrate that our general model allows a treatment of
games where players display “procedural rationality”, which we deﬁne as a gen-
eralization of Osborne and Rubinstein’s [23].
These developments account for the suitability of the model that we propose
as a quite general and useful context where one can frame other diﬀerent models.
2 The model
Consider an (abstract) set of players I. For each player i ∈ I, let Ai denote his
action set. Denote A :=
Q
i∈I Ai and A−i :=
Q
j6=i Aj henceforth. Besides, we
decompose a = (ai,a−i) following the usual convention in game theory.
Let Di ⊆ P∗(Ai) be a collection of (nonempty) subsets of Ai such that
Ai ∈ Di. We call Di the choice domain for player i.
A choice rule for player i is a correspondence
Ci : Di × A−i 7→ Ai
which depends on the actions of other players, and such that Ci(D,a−i) ⊆ D
for every D ∈ Di and a−i ∈ A−i.
Abusing notation, we denote Ci(a−i) = Ci(Ai,a−i), the evaluation of the
choice rule Ci(·,a−i) on the full set Ai (for a given vector of strategies (a−i) of
the other players).
A (normal-form) game is a tuple (I,{Ai,Ci}i∈I) where I is the set of players,
Ai are the action sets, and Ci are the choice rules.
A Choice-Nash equilibrium of the game so deﬁned is a proﬁle a∗ ∈ A such
that, for all i ∈ I, a∗
i ∈ Ci(a∗
−i). In words: given the other players’ strategies
(a∗
−i), player i chooses a∗
i.
For the sake of the exposition, we proceed to argue how we can subsume
some well-known models in our framework. We stick to the set I of players,
each having Ai as her action set.
Example 2.1. Consider the case of quasiconcave preferences (Debreu [8]) as
exposed e.g. in [22, Chapter 2]; namely, each player has a preference (complete,
transitive) relation <i on A (perhaps derived from payoﬀs or utilities) satisfying
quasiconcavity (i.e. the set {ai ∈ Ai|(ai,a∗
−i) < a∗} is convex for all a∗ ∈ A).
Deﬁne, for every agent i, Di = P∗(Ai) and the choice rule Ci : Di × A−i 7→ Ai
given by maximality, i.e. Ci(D,a−i) = {xi ∈ D : (xi,a−i) <i (yi,a−i) for all
yi ∈ D} whenever D ⊆ Ai. Then, a Nash equilibrium in the sense of that work
is a Choice-Nash equilibrium of (I,{Ai,Ci}i∈I).
Example 2.2. We can put aside the transitivity assumption of the previous ex-
ample by dealing e.g. with SSB games; see Kreweras [15], Fishburn and Rosen-
thal [12]. This model accounts for cycles in the players’ preferences as well.
In this case, each player expresses her preferences on A by means of φi :
A × A −→ R bilinear and skew-symmetric (φi(x,y) = −φi(y,x)); we should
read that i’s preference for x is at least as much as her preference for y if and
3only if φi(x,y) > 0 (see Section 3.1 below for more details). Deﬁne now, for
every agent i, Di = P∗(Ai) and the choice rule Ci : Di × A−i 7→ Ai given
by Ci(D,a−i) = {xi ∈ D : φi((xi,a−i),(yi,a−i)) > 0 for all yi ∈ D} when-
ever D ⊆ Ai. Then, a Nash equilibrium in the sense of [15] is a Choice-Nash
equilibrium of (I,{Ai,Ci}i∈I).
2.1 Elementary existence results
There are conditions in the literature that grant the existence of Nash equilibria
for models as in the examples above. The references we have cited provide sets
of conditions that apply to each instance. Under continuity of the preferences,
and quasi-concavity of each on the corresponding Ai, Proposition 20.3 of [22]
ensures the existence of Nash equilibria when each Ai is a nonempty, compact
and convex subset of a Euclidean space. [15], and afterwards [12], prove that
SSB games have a Nash equilibrium when Ai is i’s simplex of mixed strategies
on a ﬁnite set of pure strategies. Both papers use a proof exactly analogous to
Nash’s [18] proof for the existence of equilibria in ﬁnite noncooperative games.
So the question arises as to when can we ensure that games under our re-
quirements have a Choice-Nash equilibrium. In order to apply the classical
tools, the proverbial ﬁxed-point characterization is available. We just have to
deﬁne C : A 7→ A such that C(a) =
Q
i∈I Ci(a−i) for every a ∈ A. Now, a
Choice-Nash equilibrium is a ﬁxed point of C.
Following Nash [17], Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point Theorem is typically used to
yield the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We proceed now to make this quite
trivial development explicit while introducing our basic requirements. Other
possibilities are outlined as well.
First, we restrict the sets Ai to be simplexes over ﬁnite strategy sets.
Condition 1. Every Ai is the simplex of mixed strategies on a ﬁnite set of pure
strategies Si = {si
1,...,si
mi} for each i.
The second requirement is merely that choices should be “continuous” in
other agents’ actions.
Condition 2. Ci(·) is “continuous” with respect to a−i, in the closed-graph
sense: if {ak}k∈N is a sequence in A converging to a and an
i ∈ Ci(an
−i) for all
n, then ai ∈ Ci(a−i).
Note that, under Condition 1, Ci has a closed graph (as required by condition
2) if and only if it is closed-valued and u.h.c. (see e.g. [14, 7.1.15, 7.1.16] or [4,
11.9]).
Under Conditions 1 and 2, Kakutani’s Theorem translates into the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.3. Suppose Conditions 1 and 2 hold, and that Ci is convex-
and nonempty-valued for all i ∈ I. Then (I,{Ai,Ci}i∈I) has a Choice-Nash
equilibrium. Furthermore, the set of Nash equilibria is closed and hence compact.
Proof. Apply Kakutani’s ﬁxed point Theorem to the correspondence C : A 7→ A
(each Ai is clearly convex and compact). It follows from a standard result (see
e.g. [4, 11.18(a)]) that the set of ﬁxed points of C is closed in A, and hence
compact (since A is compact). 
4Similarly, subsequent generalizations of Kakutani’s result would permit to
widen the reach of this general Proposition in a predictable manner. For in-
stance, the convexity requirement can be substantially weakened through an
appeal to the Eilenberg-Montgomery ﬁxed point theorem:
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that, in Proposition 2.3, C was only star-shaped
valued (or, more generally, that the images of C are contractible sets or even
acyclic sets).3 Then the thesis of Proposition 2.3 follows as well.
Proof. C has acyclic compact values and A is a product of simplexes (hence a
contractible polyhedron). Hence, the result follows from the Eilenberg-Montgomery
ﬁxed point theorem (see e.g. [4, 15.9]). 
This latter result can also be further generalized, weakening Condition 1.
Park [24, Theorem A or B] reexamines prior ﬁxed point theorems in the line
of the Eilenberg-Montgomery ﬁxed point theorem.4 Applying these results, the
previous theorem still holds if the set A is not a product of simplexes but only
a nonempty and convex set of a locally convex topological vector space (hence
admissible, see [24, p. 84]).
Besides, diﬀerent applications might demand alternative axiomatizations.
We here oﬀer yet another existence result for cases where Condition 2 is not
granted; it will allow us to derive existence results in a well-known model with
non-transitive agents (cf. Subsection 3.2).
Proposition 2.5. Suppose that Condition 1 holds and that Ci is convex- and
nonempty-valued, for all i ∈ I. Suppose, further, that the graph of C is open in
A × A. Then (I,{Ai,Ci}i∈I) has a Choice-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The set Gi = {(ai,a−i) : ai ∈ Ci(a−i)} is open in A, which is normal, for
each i. By either Uryshon’s characterization of normality or Tietze’s extension
theorem, there is fi : A −→ [0,1] continuous that vanishes on the complement
of Gi and is strictly positive in Gi. Now, mi : A−i −→ Ai given by mi(a−i) =
argmaxai∈Ai fi(a−i,·) is a well-deﬁned correspondence and has closed graph by
continuity of each fi. Observe that fi(ai,a−i) > 0 if and only if ai ∈ Ci(a−i).
Let co(mi(a−i)) be the convex hull of mi(a−i). Since Ci(a−i) is a convex set, it
follows that co(mi(a−i)) ⊆ Ci(a−i); here we use that Ci(a−i) 6= ∅ and therefore
maxai∈Ai fi(a−i) > 0. We deﬁne B : A −→ A by B(a) =
Q
co(mi(a−i)), non-
empty valued and with convex values. Its graph is closed, by a routine check
using Nikaido [21, Theorems 4.5 and 4.8]. By Kakutani’s theorem, there is
a ∈ A with a ∈ B(a) ⊆ C(a). 
We leave the details of further enhancements to the reader, for utmost
generality is not our main purpose in this contribution. For instance: Con-
dition 1 in Proposition 2.5 could be replaced with convexity and compactness
of each Ai without substantial changes in the proof. Observe that this latter
result could also be proven from Browder’s ﬁxed point theorem (see [5], Bor-
der [4, 15.6], or Klein and Thompson [14, 8.2.2]); just note that C satisﬁes that
3A set S is star-shaped if there exists a distinguished element x0 such that all convex
combinations of x0 and any other element of S are in S; all convex sets are star-shaped. A set
is contractible if it can be continuously deformed into a single point; all star-shaped sets are
contractible. A set is acyclic if it has the same homology group as a singleton; all contractible
sets are acyclic. For more details, see Park [24] or [4, 15.8].
4An overview of this branch of the ﬁxed-point literature can be found in [25].
5C−1(a) = {a ∈ A : a ∈ C(a)} is open in A by deﬁnition of the product topology
in A×A. The reader might also appreciate a comparison of Proposition 2.5 and
the (ﬁxed point) theorem in Gale and Mas-Colell [13]; despite the similarity in
the statements, we employ a diﬀerent proof technique that was inspired by the
prospective application.
2.2 Conditions from non-binary choice
The aim of Subsection 2.1 was merely to translate well-known patterns of proof
into (elementary) existence results within our framework. Of course, the ap-
peal to explicit conditions on the best reply correspondence has clear formal
advantages and, in consequence, has been frequently adopted in the literature.
However, the motivation for doing so has been notational convenience more of-
ten than real gain in generality from moving to non-binary preferences. This
statement is exempliﬁed e.g. in the aforementioned motivation for the (ﬁxed
point) theorem in Gale and Mas-Colell [13]. The lack of a non-binary back-
ground is explicitly admitted in more recent texts, such as the authoritative [4,
Chapter 19]. There, the author complains that despite being “convenient to
describe preferences in terms of the good reply correspondence rather than the
preference relation [...] we lose some information by doing this.” This position
contrasts with Nehring’s [20]; this author argues that “the traditional assump-
tion of binariness on preference relations or choice functions is [...] analytically
unhelpful and normatively unfounded [...]” on the basis e.g. of unresolvedness
of preferences. “Dropping binariness,” he says, “may lead to a deeper under-
standing of abstract choice theory.”
In this Subsection we aim at providing and discussing sensible conditions
which will allow us to apply the arguments above, and by doing so derive non-
trivial existence results of non-binary nature that incorporate classical theorems
as particular cases. Relying on Nehring [19] and Alcantud [1], we present now
two sets of elementary conditions on choice rules which we will then use to
provide new general existence theorems.
It is convenient to introduce the following notation. For each i = 1,...,n and
a−i ∈ A−i, let
Ca−i : Di 7→ Ai
be the correspondence deﬁned by Ca−i(Di) = Ci(Di,a−i) on each Di ∈ Di.
We are hence generalizing the concept of best response to the other players’
proﬁle (the vector a−i), under the restriction that only a part of the action set
(the subset Di) is available, and according to the primitive choice procedure
determined by Ci. Note that Ca−i(Ai) = Ci(a−i) for each agent i.
Condition 3. For each i = 1,...,n, the choice domain Di includes all ﬁnite
subsets of Ai. Further, for all a−i ∈
Q
j6=i Aj, Ca−i satisﬁes that:
(a) If S ⊆ Ai is ﬁnite, then Ca−i(S) 6= ∅ and also MS = {ai ∈ Ai : ai ∈
Ca−i(S ∪ {ai})} is closed.
(b) For all S,T ∈ Di : T ⊆ S implies Ca−i(F) ∩ T ⊆ Ca−i(T).
(c) For all S ∈ Di, if ai ∈ S satisﬁes that for all T ⊆ S ﬁnite, ai ∈ T implies
ai ∈ Ca−i(T), then ai ∈ Ca−i(S).
6(d) For all S ∈ Di ﬁnite, MS is convex.
Lemma 2.6. Suppose Ai and Ci satisfy Conditions 1 and 3 (a), (b) and (c).
Then, for any a−i ∈
Q
j6=i Aj, the set Ci(a−i) is nonempty.
Proof. Ci(a−i) = Ca−i(Ai) 6= ∅ by the theorem in [19]. 
Observe that, for the last Lemma, compactness of each Ai (rather than the
full Condition 1) would suﬃce.
Remark 2.7. Let us brieﬂy explain Condition 3 (for a more detailed discussion,
see Nehring [19]). Part (a) refers to the non-emptiness axiom A1 in [19] and
the technical continuity axiom A3 there. Part (b) is contraction consistency, A2
in [19], sometimes called Chernoﬀ condition and a very basic choice consistency
requirement. Part (c) is ﬁnitariness, A4 in [19]; in some sense, it extends the
range of Ca−i from ﬁnite to inﬁnite sets. It is a weakening of binariness, A5 in
[19], which in turn implies it under non-emptiness and contraction consistency
(Remark 1 in [19]).
We now oﬀer an alternative set of conditions leading to the same conclusion.
We denote by co(B) the convex hull of a set B ⊆ Ai and [x,y] = co({x,y}).
Condition 4. For each i = 1,...,n, the choice domain Di includes all convex
hulls of ﬁnite subsets of Ai. Further, for all a−i ∈
Q
j6=i Aj, Ca−i satisﬁes that,
if T = {x1,...,xm} ⊆ Ai with m > 2,
(a) If z ∈ co(T), then there exists k ∈ {1,...,m} such that z ∈ Ca−i([xk,z]).
(b) For any xk ∈ T, the set MT(xk) = {z ∈ co(T)|z ∈ Ca−i([xk,z])} is closed.
(c) If xk / ∈ co(T \ {xk}) ∀k = 1,...,m, then Ca−i(co(T)) =
Tm
k=1 MT(xk).
(d) For each i ∈ I and a−i ∈ A−i, MSi(si
j) is convex for all j = 1,...,mi.
Note that we implicitly assume Condition 1 to be able to state part (d)
above. This could be avoided requiring (d) to be fulﬁlled for all sets MT(xk) as
in (b).
The conditions (a), (b) and (c) above are conditions B1(a), B2(a), and B1(c)
in Alcantud [1]. Applying the results there, we have:
Lemma 2.8. Suppose Ai and Ci satisfy Conditions 1 and 4 (a), (b) and (c).
Then, for any a−i ∈
Q
j6=i Aj, the set Ci(a−i) is nonempty.
Proof. Ci(a−i) = Ca−i(co((si
1,...,si
mi)) 6= ∅ by Theorem 1 in [1]. Observe that,
by construction, the domain of each Ca−i meets the restriction imposed in that
work (the convex hull of every ﬁnite set should be in the domain). 
Remark 2.9. Let us now discuss Condition 4 (for more details, see [1]). Part
(a) says that, when considering a ﬁnite number of options, the agent can al-
ways declare a mixture z eligible when compared with obtaining for sure some
of the possible outcomes of z. As long as the rationality of the agent allows
him to dispose of at least one option out of a ﬁnite number of alternatives, this
requirement is quite weak (see, however, Section 3.4).
Condition 4(b) and (d) are technical requirements. Part (b) captures a cer-
tain continuity of the choice rule with respect to changes in the set of available
7alternatives. Part (d) is a weak convexity requirement; notice that, under Con-
dition 1, it is only required for MT(xk) such that T is the whole pure-strategy
set and xk is a pure strategy.
While somewhat more involved, Condition 4(c) is quite sensible in the cur-
rent framework. Basically, it says as follows. Agent i considers the other play-
ers’ proﬁle a−i as given, and ponders what she could get from varying her own
(mixed) strategy ai. In the event that two proﬁles of these, namely a = (ai,a−i)
and e a = (e ai,a−i), are each chosen against a ﬁxed pure strategy sj (and every
mixture of sj and it), then Condition 4(c) requests that any arbitrarily selected
mixture of them must satisfy the same requirement. But that mixture of them
consists of randomizing between ai and e ai, while the others’ strategies are kept.
We think that this behavior is quite a weak rationality assumption on the agent’s
behavior, that is met in most normal-form game models. We will return to this
point later on in subsequent Sections.
Condition 4(c) is a strengthening of
(c0) if z ∈ Ca−i([xk,z]) for all k = 1,...,m then z ∈ Ca−i(co(T))
(which is condition B1 (b) in [1]), in the sense that the former not only accounts
for the inclusion
T
j=1,...,n MT(aj) ⊆ Ca−i(co(T)) for all i = 1,..,n and T =
{a1,...,an} ∈ Ai, but it rather states that both sets are equal. The reader should
note that, for choice correspondences that derive from a binary relation, the
non-trivial implication in Condition 4(c) is that given by (c0). Therefore, for
that type of choice correspondences, requesting one or the other is equivalent.
Theorem 2.10. Suppose that (I,{Ai,Ci}i∈I) satisﬁes Conditions 1,2 and ei-
ther of 3 or 4. Then the set of Choice-Nash equilibria is nonempty and compact.
Proof. Let us check that the requirements of Proposition 2.3 are met by the
correspondence C, i.e. we should show that each Ci is convex- and nonempty-
valued.
Firstly, either Lemma 2.6 or 2.8 applies, ensuring Ci(a−i) 6= ∅.
Secondly, we prove that any of Conditions 3 or 4 imply convex-valuedness
of each Ci.
Under Condition 3, it follows by (b) plus (c) -see Remark 3 in Nehring [19]-
that Ci(a−i) =
T
S⊆Aiﬁnite MS, and so it is convex due to (d).








is convex for all i = 1,..,n and a−i ∈
Q
j6=i Aj by (d). 
3 Particular results in speciﬁc frameworks
Along this Section, some known results in diﬀerent frameworks will be obtained
as Corollaries to Theorem 2.10 (Subsections 3.1 and 3.3). Through the use of
the general existence results in Propositions 2.5 and 2.3 we shall derive: (a) the
game-theoretical model contained in Shafer and Sonnenschein [28] (Subsection
3.2), and (b) a new result on existence of S(k)-equilibria in games with proce-
durally rational players, plus a discussion of its relationship with the model at
hand (Subsection 3.4).
83.1 SSB games
We turn our attention back to Example 2.2. SSB preferences (see e.g. [11])
are those which can be represented by a skew-symmetric bilinear function φ in
the following way: an alternative x is (weakly) SSB-better than another one,
y, if and only if φ(x,y) > 0. Such preferences (see [27] for a straightforward
representation theorem) need not be transitive or satisfy the independence ax-
iom, although of course the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern framework is
encompassed as a particular case.5
We call an SSB game any game where players have a ﬁnite number of strate-
gies (and hence every agent’s action set is the simplex of mixed strategies) and
players have SSB preferences. As commented above, Kreweras [15] already ob-
tained existence of Nash equilibria in SSB games. In this subsection we ﬁrst
proceed to obtain such existence result as a Corollary to Theorem 2.10, and then
we digress to give yet another possible alternative proof that does not appeal
to the model at hand.
In this context, we should proceed with the choice correspondences given by
Ca−i(Di) = {xi ∈ Di : φi((xi,a−i), (yi,a−i)) > 0 ∀y ∈ Di}, for each Di ⊆ Ai
and a−i.
The argument of the Example in [1] shows that the choice correspondence
Ca−i in fact satisﬁes Condition 4(a), (b), and (c0). In order to check that
4(c) does hold, we need to ensure that ai ∈ Ca−i(co(a1,...,an)) yields ai ∈
Ca−i([aj,a]) for all j = 1,...,n, which is quite immediate by binariness, irre-
spectively of {a1,...,an} ⊆ Ai (see Remark 2.9).
The fact that each MSi(sj) is convex follows easily from linearity of φ in the
ﬁrst component.
Condition 2 is satisﬁed quite naturally here.
The argument above justiﬁes, on the ground of Theorem 2.10:
Corollary 3.1. [Kreweras [15], Fishburn and Rosenthal [12]] Any SSB game
has a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the set of Nash equilibria is compact.
Needless to say, the reasoning above could be adapted to yield a direct proof
of Corollary 3.1. We proceed to give a short expos´ e of the proof arising, for it
is diﬀerent from that given by Kreweras and by Fishburn and Rosenthal.
Under the requirements of the Corollary, the best replies correspondence is
nonempty due to Theorem 3 in Fishburn [10] and convex-valued due to linearity
in the ﬁrst component of each φi. The fact that C has a closed graph follows
easily from linearity (therefore continuity) in each component of every φi. By
Kakutani’s ﬁxed point Theorem, the game has a Nash equilibrium.
3.2 The non-transitive model by Shafer and Sonnenschein
Another classical result on equilibrium existence when agents display non-transitive
preferences is Shafer and Sonnenschein [28]. Although their theorem refers to
abstract economies or generalized games, the version for games is available e.g.
in Border [4, Corollary 19.4]. We here show how it can be derived from Propo-
sition 2.5. As in Subsection 3.1, player i is assumed to express his tastes on
5See [7] and [2] for a discussion of the SSB model as a framework for dynamic models of
selection of preferences.
9possible outcomes by a binary relation i, for each i ∈ I; then, a correspon-
dence Pi : A 7→ Ai is deﬁned by Pi(a) = {ai ∈ Ai : (ai,a−i) i a}. Accordingly,
thus, a ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the deﬁned game if and only if Pi(a) = ∅
for all i ∈ I. The only restrictions on the relations are those in the following
statement:
Corollary 3.2. [Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975)] Let (I,{Ai,i}i∈I) be a
game such that Condition 1 holds and each Pi has open graph. Assume, further,
that for each a ∈ A there is a player i for which ai 6∈ co(Pi(a)). Then, the game
has a Nash equilibrium, i.e. there is a ∈ A with Pi(a) = ∅ for all i = 1,...,n.
Proof. Deﬁne the correspondence C : A 7→ A by C(a) =
Q
i=1,...,n co(Pi(a)). It
has open graph, and, obviously, convex values. Observe that C can not have a
ﬁxed point, since that would mean ai 6∈ co(Pi(a)) for a ﬁxed a ∈ A, irrespectively
of i. Proposition 2.5 forcefully yields Pi(a) = ∅ for some a ∈ A and all i. 
Note that the restriction on the binary relations that model the players’
preferences is yet weaker than that in the original statement. The original
requirement that each Ai is convex and compact has been replaced by Condition
1 by convenience, and could be restored without altering the proof, as noted
before.
3.3 An “extreme” case: players with continuous prefer-
ences
Consider Example 2.1, and the comment following it. In the event that the
assumptions in Proposition 20.3 of [22] hold (continuity of the preferences, quasi-
concavity of each on the corresponding Ai, that is assumed nonempty, compact
and convex subset of a Euclidean space), the argument in the proof in [22]
says that C is nonempty-valued (by a well-known theorem by Bergstrom [3]
and Walker [31]) and convex-valued (by quasi-concavity). Because the graph
was also closed, Proposition 2.3 applies. Also, the reader can observe that
since C had closed values the set of Nash equilibria was closed. In fact, it is
quite simple to check that this case is contained in the setting of Theorem 2.10,
version Condition 3. This comes without surprise, since Nehring’s [19] result
extended the maximun theorem of Bergstrom and Walker, which is the key
for Kakutani’s argument to apply. In order to do that, he stated (Remark 1)
that in conditions weaker than our current requirements -basically, because of
binariness- Conditions 3 (a) -except for closedness of the MS’s- (b) and (c) must
hold. Now, closedness of each MS arises from continuity of the preferences.
Also, (d) follows easily from quasi-concavity on the corresponding Ai, for if
S = {u1,...,um} then MS = {ai ∈ Ai : (ai,a−i) <i (sk,a−i) k = 1,...,m} = T
k=1,...,m{ai ∈ Ai : (ai,a−i) <i (sk,a−i)} is an intersection of convex subsets.
Some further comments on this digression are in order.
Firstly: in fact, under Condition 1 all the assumptions in Theorem 2.10,
version Condition 4, are fulﬁlled too, except Condition 4(c). Still, a relevant
particular instance of that model does ﬁt into the framework considered in this
other version of Theorem 2.10. It suﬃces to restrict ourselves to the case where
not only {ai ∈ Ai : (ai,a∗
−i) <i a∗}, but also {ai ∈ Ai : a∗ <i (ai,a∗
−i)}, are
convex for each a∗ ∈ A. The comment on the deﬁnition of B1 in [1] puts forward
a number of preferences that satisfy that further requirement. Besides, that
10latter particular model accounts for the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility case.
Secondly: not only the original statement of Nash’s equilibrium theorem is,
therefore, encompassed by Proposition 2.3 (and Theorem 2.10). Also, general-
izations such as Park’s [24, Theorem 7] can be suitably subsumed in our model.
An appeal to Proposition 2.4 would explain this latter generalization in the
same manner as we have embodied Nash’s result through Proposition 2.3.
3.4 Procedural rationality
In [23], Osborne and Rubinstein put forward a model of bounded rationality
where players try each available action (strategy) once before deciding what to
play. In the symmetric, two-player case, the corresponding solution concept is
an S(1)-equilibrium: a probability distribution α∗ over available actions such
that, for each action x, α∗(x) gives the probability that a player ﬁnds x to be
the best (breaking ties equiprobably) when sampling each action once, given
that the opponent plays according to α∗.6
This “procedural rationality” and the corresponding equilibrium concept can
obviously be generalized to encompass asymmetric N-player games. Assume
Condition 1, and let πi : A 7→ R denote player i’s payoﬀ function. Given a
vector of probability distributions a−i ∈ A−i, and a pure strategy si
j, consider
the random variables πi(si
j,s
−i
j ) where the opponents’ strategies s
−i
j are drawn
according to a−i. Let C(a−i)(si
j) be the probability that strategy si
j yields the
highest payoﬀ when each random variable πi(si
j,s
−i
j ) is drawn independently,
breaking ties equiprobably.7
Further, the assumption of breaking ties in a pre-speciﬁed manner can be
disposed with if we are willing to allow for choice correspondences in the sense
of the present work. Given a−i ∈ A−i, interpreted as a vector of probability
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where the s
−i
j are drawn independently according to a−i
In general, neither the C
+
i nor the C
−
i need to add up to 1, even generically,
due to non-zero probability ties given a−i. [23] postulate a particular form of
breaking ties (equiprobably) in order to obtain a single-valued function. An
alternative generating a choice correspondence is to allow for all admissible








k) ∀k = 1,...,mi
6See Sethi [26] for a dynamic interpretation of this model.
7That is, for each strategy si
j, one extraction of s−i, denoted s−i
j , is made according to a−i,
all these extractions being independent. This way, the payoﬀs of the strategies si
j are random






Such choice vectors correspond to all possible forms of allocating the probability
of payoﬀ ties among the involved strategies. In summary, we view procedural













The correspondence Ci captures procedural rationality. An S(1)-equilibrium in
the sense of [23] corresponds now to a Choice-Nash equilibrium of (I,{Ai,Ci}i∈I).
Note that Condition 1 holds by construction, and Condition 2 follows from
the continuity (actually, bilinearity) of the payoﬀ functions πi. Moreover, Ci(a−i)
is obviously nonempty (e.g. it contains the rule given by [23]), convex, and closed
by construction (being the intersection of a product of intervals and a simplex).
Proposition 2.3 now implies:
Corollary 3.3. Any game such that every agent’s action set is the simplex
of mixed strategies on a ﬁnite set of pure strategies has an S(1)-equilibrium.
Moreover, the set of S(1)-equilibria is closed.
Osborne and Rubinstein [23] provide an existence result for the case of sym-
metric, two-player games, using that, under equiprobable breaking of ties, the
associated, single-valued choice rule is continuous and hence Brouwer’s Theo-
rem applies. Our result diﬀers in that we consider a multi-valued choice rule by
allowing for any allocation of the probabilities of ties among agents, and hence
we ultimately resort to Kakutani’s Theorem. [23] also deﬁne the concept of
S(k)-equilibrium, where agents try each strategy not once but k times before
actually taking a decision. Of course, the arguments above can also be applied
to this concept.
Example 3.4. We conclude this section showing that Corollary 3.3 covers a
case not covered in Theorem 2.10. For that, we show that procedural rationality
does not fulﬁll Condition 4(a).
For this, we must ﬁrst extend the choice correspondence to any set of the
form co(T) with T a ﬁnite subset of Ai. This can be done as follows. Given a
“prospect” (or mixed strategy) x ∈ T, deﬁne the (expected) payoﬀ ˜ π(x,s−i) = P
si∈Si x(si) · π(si,s−i), and let ˜ C(T,a−i)(x) be deﬁned as above (where the
prospects in T now play the role of pure strategies). This is a probability dis-
tribution over the elements of T (which are mixed strategies), which in turn in-
duces a probability distribution over pure strategies through C(co(T),a−i)(si) =
{
P
x∈T x(si) · z(x) | z ∈ ˜ C(T,a−i)}. Obviously, C(co(T),a−i)(si) ⊆ co(T).
Consider the following “Rock-Scissors-Paper” symmetric, two-player game.
R S P
R 1 2 0
S 0 1 2
P 2 0 1




be easily checked that this proﬁle also constitutes an S(1)-equilibrium, i.e. a
Choice-Nash equilibrium under procedural rationality.
12Let a−i = σ. Since σ is a convex combination of the three pure strategies,
Condition 4(a) would require the existence of one pure strategy s ∈ {R,S,P}
such that σ ∈ Cσ([s,σ]). However, note that πi(σ,s−i) = 1 for any s−i, and
hence, given T = {σ,s} with s ∈ {R,S,P} and D = co(T),
˜ C+(D,σ)(σ) = Prob(πi(σ,s−i) > πi(s,s0−i)) =
2
3
˜ C−(D,σ)(σ) = Prob(πi(σ,s−i) > πi(s,s0−i)) =
1
3
where we use the notation s−i and s0−i to emphasize that they correspond to
independent random realizations of the opponents’ strategies, according to a−i.
However, σ ∈ C(D,σ) if and only if (0,1) ∈ ˜ C(D,σ), and hence in this case the
mixture σ is not preferred over any pure strategy, even though (σ,σ) is both a
Nash equilibrium and a Choice-Nash equilibrium of the game under Procedural
Rationality.
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